

1964

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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[From the Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1964]  
VIETNAM OF 1964 RECALLS KOREA OF 1950  
(By Marquis Childs)

The really deep trouble in Vietnam lies outside the scope of American sea and air power. The great question is whether the South Vietnamese Army has the will to go on fighting on the ground against Communist guerrillas after 17 years of almost unrelenting warfare.

Before the naval action in the Gulf of Tonkin, evidence was accumulating that war weariness and political dissension in Saigon had raised grave doubts about the future. Hints were coming from the military clique headed by Gen. Nguyen Khanh that the United States would have to take a much larger share of the burden, including even direct participation in combat.

On the recommendation of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, the new Ambassador in Saigon, Washington moved to increase the number of American military advisers from 16,000 to 22,000. They were, it was reported, empowered to fire back if fired on. No one can say whether this will be enough.

At the same time, disturbing rumors have circulated in Saigon about a new coup to replace General Khanh. If the worst should happen, the Johnson administration faces an awesome choice—sending in large numbers of American combat troops or expanding the war with massive bombing in the north. The risks in either course are incalculable. To get out, a third choice, seems impossible in view of what has gone before and in the light of politics in the presidential year.

The beginning of the Korean war 14 years ago comes vividly to mind. The atmosphere then was very much what it is today. Republicans and Democrats were rallying around President Truman and promising him support against Communist aggression. Robert A. Taft, minority leader in the Senate, gave reluctant assent despite his strong isolationist convictions. It was a moment of patriotic fervor in which Mr. Truman, by almost unanimous opinion, emerged as a strong and decisive President.

But that mood quickly altered. As the woefully untrained American troops that were rushed from Japan were pushed back almost off the Korean Peninsula with fearful casualties, it became "Truman's war."

By the 1952 campaign and the disaster resulting from the massive Chinese invasion, this was the chief line of Republican attack. General Eisenhower could say at the University of Illinois that Midwestern farm boys should stay at home and let Asians fight Asians.

Mr. Truman had resisted the demand to bomb the privileged sanctuary across the Yalu River. He had shown marked restraint out of concern that the war would be enlarged to a global scale. He was damned from hell to breakfast for that restraint.

There is one important difference today. In 1950, Mr. Truman went to the United Nations before responding to the North Korean attack. By a piece of luck, the Soviet delegate was absent, so that the Security Council could pass a resolution calling on the U.N. to join in resisting aggression. This time the United States struck first.

Except for the Communist nations, almost every U.N. member approved a joint defense of Korea. Even neutralist India sent an ambulance unit. If a widened conflict develops in Vietnam, this country will find it hard to rally support. It will have the look of a war waged by white men against Asians.

This is, in effect, what President de Gaulle has been saying—that the war, as it is currently being fought, cannot be won. The French tried for nearly 7 years, beginning in 1947, and they sacrificed the cream of St. Cyr, their West Point, in the vain effort. Unhappily, De Gaulle's prescription for end-

ing the war has been based on a formula of neutralization that sounds like surrender.

Three long-term consequences of a greatly enlarged war in Asia, if it comes to that, are unforeseeable. The most important single event of the last 2 to 3 years has been the split between, the Soviet Union and China, with reverberations throughout the Communist world. In recent weeks that split has seemed to be irreconcilable. It could be healed by a war between the United States and China. Expert opinion here is that Moscow would stop short with condemnation of American moves.

But that is conjecture. As often in the past, the most baffling and frustrating element in the new crisis is the enigma of Red China. American policy has walled off a nation of 600 or 700 million people and what goes on in the fastness of Peiping is as mysterious as what may be happening on Mars. That may have been inevitable after Korea. But it is today a tragic commentary on the darkness that cloaks the dubious future in Asia.

[From a Milwaukee Journal editorial, Aug. 6, 1964, as reported in the New York Times]

## APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT

It may be that the North Vietnamese, with the backing of Communist China, were testing the American will. If so, they have their answer.

There is some danger that this country may tend to overreact to North Vietnamese stings because of our political situation. President Johnson has been under attack for what opponents call a "no win" policy in southeast Asia. He has been unwisely urged to escalate the war.

Under such circumstances, a President can be handicapped in making vital decisions. President Johnson will need courage and patience and restraint to keep the Nation from the wider war that he—and all who realize what modern war is—wish to avoid.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a joint resolution (H.J. Res. 1145) to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

## MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 189) to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, has my time expired?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MORSE. In fairness to the Senator from Alaska, I cannot yield any more time.

Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time not to be charged to either side.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold that suggestion?

Mr. McNAMARA. I withhold it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Since the House has passed a joint resolution which I understand is identical to our resolution, by a vote of 414 to 0, with one Member voting present, and the House joint resolution has now been received by the Senate, is it proper to ask unanimous consent to take up the House joint resolution and substitute it for the Senate joint resolution?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is proper to ask unanimous consent to take up the House joint resolution, and to vote on the House joint resolution in lieu of the Senate joint resolution.

Mr. MORSE. Temporarily, I shall have to object. When the time has been exhausted, if the Senator wishes to renew his request, I may not object. I do not wish to sacrifice any more of our time. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, how much time have I remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What happened to my 7 minutes? Every time I inquire as to how much time I have left, the time goes down by 5 minutes. I was not talking on my time. I was responding to a question by the Senator from Wisconsin. I did not yield myself any time to respond to the question. I do not see how I can possibly have used any time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair's statement as to the remaining time is based on what the Parliamentary advises the Chair.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Perhaps his watch—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All these discussions take a great deal of time.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It depends on whose time it is. The Senator from Arkansas did not yield any time.

Mr. MORSE. This is becoming ridiculous. I ask unanimous consent that the agreement be extended for an additional 10 minutes, with that time made available to the Senator from Arkansas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I voted for this resolution in the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, and I expect to support it when we vote in the Senate today.

In the committee I had the occasion to commend the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, and—of course—the President of the United States, on the action which they took in response to the unprovoked, premeditated, and deliberate attacks made on our naval ships on the 2d of August and again on the night of the 4th of August.

The facts are indisputable. At the time of the first attack by the North Vietnamese PT boats on the U.S.S. *Maddox* on August 2, the U.S.S. *Maddox* was

something in the neighborhood of 25 to 30 miles offshore operating in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. According to the testimony, the commander of the U.S.S. *Maddox* had some information that this attack might develop and he was seeking to avoid any contact with the PT boats, yet they pursued and overtook him, firing torpedoes at his ship and subsequently coming alongside and strafing him with .50-caliber machineguns.

The U.S.S. *Maddox* returned the fire, damaging seriously one of the PT boats. It was shortly after this occasion that we were briefed by the Department of Defense as to just what had transpired. Secretary McNamara told us of plans to continue to operate our naval ships in the international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, and said that now the President had given orders for the ships and men not only to defend themselves, but to shoot to destroy. It was shortly after these orders went out that we were called to the White House and told of the second attack by a host of North Vietnamese PT boats against not only the U.S.S. *Maddox*, but the destroyer *C. Turner Joy* which was operating in conjunction with the *Maddox* some 65 miles from the nearest coast.

After all the facts were presented to us no responsible persons could arrive at any other conclusion than that the attacks were deliberate and intended to be provocative. When the President told us of his orders in response to the attack, it was agreed by all those present that our retaliation was appropriate. It was decisive; it was thorough; it was quick, and yet it was restrained and it was measured. The punishment fit the crime.

By such action the President of the United States made it clear that the United States was not going to have its ships, its men, or its flag, shot at or attacked anywhere in the world where we had a legal right to be without quick and decisive response. This action is, figuratively speaking, language which the Communists understand. If they made a miscalculation with respect to whether or not the United States was in truth and in fact, as their propaganda had insisted, a "paper tiger," they no longer suffer from such disillusionment. They now know for a certainty that we will respond totally and completely if necessary, to any unwarranted action they may take against us.

They now understand that we are concerned in southeast Asia through our membership in the SEATO Organization; and that our commitments there are totally concerned with protecting the newly independent countries of southeast Asia and assisting them in achieving freedom and democracy. They now know that we are not going to be bluffed or bullied out of our commitments to our friends and allies in that area of the world.

I, along with others, approved of this action by the President of the United States because I believe it signifies a long needed change in policy. It, in effect, states that there will never again be a haven behind which the Communists can hide after they have made attacks

on us, such as existed in Korea, north of the 38th parallel.

If we should become involved in stepped-up military action in the Asiatic theater, and we of course hope and pray that we do not, but if we do, the Communists must understand that there will be no sanctuary from which their military forces can operate with impunity.

I hope and trust that those who would make these momentous decisions for the Communist world, would understand that the policy has changed.

Mr. President, I shall not delay the Senate longer. I am sure each Senator has his mind already made up. I am certain that a vast majority of Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle stand wholeheartedly behind this action taken by the President of the United States.

I am certain that every Member of the United States Congress who votes for this resolution recognizes that if we do not make such response—as we did in this recent instance against the North Vietnamese—there will be other more serious aggressions against us, and others in the free world. And the time would come when we would be forced out of international waters, and forced to retreat and run from our friends and allies around the face of the globe. This resolution makes it clear that we stand behind the President in a firm resolve to give whatever is required in time, substance, money or lives to the protection of those ideals of freedom which we hold so dear and for which this Nation has so long stood. I feel that each Senator who supports this resolution recognizes that in being true to our heritage we have no other course.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, last night I read in one of the local newspapers a speculative article which undertook to give this subject something of a partisan cast. One of the expressions used was, "The President has done it again." That is an unfortunate speculation, because that was not involved in any of the discussions we have had about the joint resolution.

I attended the briefing at the White House. It lasted for almost an hour and a half. The whole case was laid on the table by the President, by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, by the Secretary of Defense, and by the Secretary of State. Thereafter, there was no limit on the amount of discussion or on the questions that any member of the joint leadership from both the House and Senate might have wished to propound, whether they were addressed to the Secretaries or to the President.

When the meeting was over, we discussed the content of a resolution, with the understanding that the resolution could be modified and simplified, if that were necessary or deemed desirable. That was the whole story.

Before we left the Cabinet room, the President asked every Member who was present whether he would give support to the resolution. Every Member responded. I am rather proud of the fact

that every Republican who responded said that, speaking for himself and, hopefully, for the party, he would support the President in his determination to meet the crisis now before us in the South Pacific.

This is in line with every policy statement that the minority policy committee and the minority party have made with respect to foreign affairs. We have constantly emphasized that all we ask, when a decision is pending or a crisis is upon us, is to be consulted, to have an opportunity to offer alternative proposals and substitutes. When we have had our day in court and the decision has been made, we are prepared to abide by the decision and to demonstrate to the whole wide world that there is no division between the Executive and Congress in repelling aggression aimed at our forces wherever we are under protocol or treaty obligations. We have religiously adhered to that posture and that policy ever since.

The President could have taken this action in his own right as the Commander in Chief. He does not have to ask Congress about the deployment of troops, submarines, bombers, and fighter planes.

What is involved is a demonstration that the executive and legislative branches of the Government stand together in an hour of need and threat, and when there is peril in a section of the world that could easily jeopardize the entire free world.

I wished to make clear how the minority stands, and how it stood in that briefing session, and also when this subject was before the various committees of the Senate and House.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

I wish to affirm what the distinguished minority leader has said. I was present at the briefings. There was not the slightest indication of any kind of partisanship in any sense. Back through the years, when similar resolutions have been under consideration, this has also been true. It was true when there was a Republican administration.

I cannot resist paying a compliment to the distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN]. While on certain matters he is a great partisan leader, nevertheless, on all matters affecting the security of this country, matters which are comparable to this kind of situation, I have never seen him be partisan, either on the floor or off the floor of the Senate. He always rises above partisanship in dealing with problems that directly involve our security and reserves his partisanship, as all of us do, for less profound subjects than those which threaten the security of our country. This is, of course, normal and demonstrates the distinction between foreign relations and domestic relations.

I did not see any such article as that to which the Senator from Illinois has referred; but if there was such an article, it was entirely in error, because there was no partisanship, and none is involved in this measure.

Now I wish to say a word or two about the House joint resolution. It passed

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the House by a vote of 414 to 0. I do not believe that in a democracy unanimity is always necessary. Certainly, it is not necessary when we are dealing with matters of substance involving domestic legislation, or even legislation dealing with foreign relations. However, in the expression of an advisory opinion of broad policy, which this resolution is, it is a happy and fortunate circumstance if there can be a high degree of unanimity. So I am much pleased by the House action. I hope the Senate will approach that unanimity, if possible.

I realize that we all have our apprehensions about what may happen in South Vietnam or elsewhere. But fundamentally, under our system, it is the President, as our representative in these activities, who must necessarily have the dominant role, however jealous we may be of our own privileges—and we rightly should be in many areas. But in dealing with the Nation's security or with threatened warfare, we must rely to a great extent on the decisions of the Executive. We always have a reserve power, when we see that the President has made a mistake. We can always later impeach him, if we like, if we believe that he has so far departed from the sense of duty that he has betrayed the interests of our country.

But essentially the joint resolution is an exhibition of solidarity in regard to the will and determination of this country as a whole, as represented in Congress, to support the broad policies that have been well announced and well described in the words of the President, both recently and in past months. We are exhibiting a desire to support those policies. That will have a strong psychological effect upon our adversaries, wherever they may be.

I believe the joint resolution is calculated to prevent the spread of the war, rather than to spread it, as has been alleged by some critics of the resolution. I have considered every possible alternative, both those that have been suggested on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere, and I still have come back to my own conclusion that the action that was taken; the resistance that was made in the Gulf of Tonkin; the joint resolution adopted in committee; and all our actions in this connection, are best designed to contribute to the deterrence of the spread of war.

No one knows, in this uncertain world, whether the war will spread. It could easily spread because of the determination of our adversaries, in spite of anything we might do. But I sincerely believe that this action, taken with such general support by both Houses of Congress, will result in deterring any ambitions or reckless adventuresome spirit on the part of the North Vietnamese or the Communist Chinese. So I ask and hope that Members of this body will support the joint resolution.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in my remarks certain editorials relating to this subject.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New Orleans (La.) Times-Picayune, Aug. 5, 1964]

## INTENTIONS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN

Whatever the Vietcong attack on the U.S. destroyer *Maddox* may mean about Communist intentions in southeast Asia, the decisive response it sparked both aboard the warship and in the White House underscores the clear American intention to stick by its commitments in that troubled area.

While viewing the incident as serious, U.S. officials were not sure what it portends. It might have been a hapless joy ride undertaken by a trio of thrill-seeking patrol boat jockeys. It might have been a tactical maneuver, a planned one-shot probe to test U.S. reflexes in a sensitive location. It might have been the opening gambit in a drive to insulate coastal supply lines between militarily important Luichow Peninsula of Red China and North Vietnam. Or it might have been a political play to forestall pending division in the Communist ranks by increasing tensions in a vital area of conflict between East and West.

Against this range of possibilities, the U.S. response was at once appropriate and cautious. The *Maddox's* counteraction against the three attacking torpedo boats and President Johnson's shoot to kill order illustrate the importance the United States attaches to continuance of patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. That waterway has significant strategic importance as a line of supply for men and material in support of guerrilla activities in South Vietnam. And it offers the readiest access for assault on supply links into North Vietnam.

Orders to bolster and defend the naval positions there seem to mean that the United States intends to stay right on the job.

[From the Richmond (Va.) Times-Dispatch, Aug. 6, 1964]

## THE MOMENT OF TRUTH

If the ghost of John Foster Dulles were lurking in the wings of the world stage at this climactic moment, he would smile grimly to see his policy of brinkmanship implemented by the very liberals who denounced his basic premise; namely, that the United States must dare to go the very brink of war in order to halt the expansion of Red imperialism.

President Johnson's statements of the past 2 days revealed the deep reluctance of the United States to risk a major war. But he paraphrased Dulles' contention when he said that "aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed."

It is reassuring to learn that our NATO and SEATO allies, with the tentative exception of France, agree that the instant retaliation ordered by Mr. Johnson was unavoidable. Yet they expressed hope that Red China will realize the futility of provoking a military showdown certain to occur, should Peiping decide to overrun southeast Asia.

Whether she will do so depends to a great extent on whether Moscow considers the time propitious to revert to Stalinism, throw in her lot with Red China, and shoot the works in a desperate gamble to destroy Western capitalism and clear the track for a Communist takeover of the globe.

Moscow's temptation to do so cannot be dismissed, but it is highly doubtful that Khrushchev—and Mao, for that matter—would risk counterrevolutions. The peoples of East and West equally dread a nuclear war that would exterminate millions and, in all likelihood, condemn survivors to a painful, lingering death on a nuclear-contaminated planet.

For the time being, Moscow has worded its comments obliquely. Tass, as the Kremlin's mouthpiece, has stated that competent Soviet circles resolutely denounced the U.S. retaliatory attack on North Vietnam as absolutely unjustified. Under the circumstances

some such gesture was to be expected. It is to Moscow's advantage to retain at least a perfunctory alliance with Peiping, if only to keep the West off balance, and Russian nuclear weaponry as a bargaining counter in negotiations over Berlin, Cuba, and her European satellites.

"Truth is the first casualty," in any war, as history has redundantly proved. The North Vietnamese propagandists claim that our report of a second attack on U.S. destroyers was a fabrication. Peiping's New China News Agency denounced Johnson's order to bomb North Vietnam bases as a move to enhance his position in the forthcoming presidential election.

Both claims are palpably false; the first, because the approach of North Vietnam's torpedo boats within range of the *Maddox* and *Joy* proved their intention to invite return fire; the second, because the President's decision to attack North Vietnam naval bases was approved by leaders of both parties and by Senator Goldwater, Mr. Johnson's opponent in the November elections.

As the President said yesterday, at Syracuse, in this crisis—"We are one Nation, united and indivisible."

[From the Atlanta (Ga.) Constitution, Aug. 4, 1964]

## POLITICAL MATURITY AS WELL AS OUR NAVY ARE TESTED IN TROUBLED ASIAN WATERS

The unprovoked North Vietnamese attack on the American destroyer *Maddox* was a test both of our naval preparedness and the maturity of our diplomatic judgment.

Happily, we came through both tests with flying colors.

The *Maddox* herself was undamaged, but she and Navy jets scored hits on two of the PT marauders. The third was stopped cold.

Diplomatically, we forcefully restated our position in southeast Asia, and President Johnson backed it up with orders for a beefed-up Navy force.

But the President, for the time being at least, declined to let the incident trigger carrying the war into North Vietnam.

The difficulties of conducting a wise foreign policy and a presidential election at the same time are well illustrated by the incident. After repeated sniping from the why-not-victory crowd, the President must have been tempted to order direct retaliation on North Vietnam. But because of the delicate involvement of Vietnam in the entire southeast Asia problem, Mr. Johnson exercised restraint.

The time may indeed come when there is no honorable alternative to retaliation on North Vietnam's land bases. We should never fail to make that clear to the Communists.

In the meantime, however, President Johnson and the Navy have made our position plain:

U.S. ships have a right to sail in international waters. They will defend that right with immediate return of fire against any attacking vessel.

North Vietnamese are probing America for any signs of weakness and dissension during this political year. It is to be hoped that none of our homegrown politicians give the Reds any comfort with scatterbrained proposals.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Lines, Aug. 6, 1964]

## UNITED STATES ANSWER TO AGGRESSION

The U.S. response to what President Johnson called deliberate and unprovoked attacks on American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin was fitting in selectivity, proper in application, and—given the clear, long-standing statement of U.S. intentions—inevitable in delivery.

There is not the slightest doubt that further attempts by the Communists to inter-

fare with U.S. ships in international waters or U.S. planes in free skies will be met with retaliatory blows of equal promptness and severity.

As the President made plain in both his address to the Nation Tuesday night and his talk at Syracuse University on Wednesday, the United States seeks no enlargement of the conflict. But this Nation is united in its belief that, in Mr. Johnson's words, "there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply."

We Americans have also the solemn compulsion to face the fact that the Communists, by their attack on American vessels in international waters, have themselves escalated the hostilities—an escalation we must meet. Thus the struggle in southeast Asia inevitably will become deadlier. At least now the cause is clear and we know what we are doing and why we do it.

The motives behind North Vietnam's deliberately aggressive acts are for the moment obscure. It must have been clear to both Hanoi and Peiping that shooting at U.S. ships would not frighten the 7th Fleet out of Tonkin Gulf. Nor, it should have been equally clear, would these acts be permitted to go unpunished.

The destruction of Red antiaircraft batteries in Laos 2 months ago after U.S. planes were shot at should have been ample proof of this.

Perhaps the North Vietnamese and Chinese were counting on U.S. retaliation as a lever to force greater Soviet commitment to the Communist side, in the belief that regardless of doctrinal differences the Russians would stand with their fellow Communists in the event of a showdown with the United States.

Perhaps the attacks were part of an overall strategic plan, timed to coincide with stepped-up ground activities in South Vietnam.

Or perhaps the intent was simply to gain a propaganda victory by a quick humiliation of vaunted U.S. seapower.

In any case the North Vietnamese challenge has been answered, and the United States has shown that any further attempt to escalate the conflict will indeed result in what North Vietnam has called grave consequences.

The Communists may believe that domestic U.S. policies precludes our taking effective action in southeast Asia. They are wrong. Senator GOLDWATER's statement Tuesday night and the response in Congress have shown that, as the President noted, "there are no parties—and there is no partisanship—when our peace or the peace of the world is imperiled by aggressors in any part of the world."

The crisis continues, and in the days ahead may intensify. U.S. strength in the area is being increased, a further earnest of our intentions to challenge any aggression. As the quickly mounted, multipronged strikes against the North Vietnamese naval installations proved, the United States has the power as well as the will to destroy selective targets on a controlled basis. Whether that power will be again used is very much up to the Communists.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Aug. 4, 1964]

#### SHOOT TO DESTROY

It is difficult to understand why the North Vietnamese would want to provide a clash with the U.S. 7th Fleet.

In any such encounter the odds would be overwhelmingly against the attackers. They have no naval force which would stand a chance in a sea engagement, and if they were to damage or sink a U.S. ship on the high seas this would amount to an engraved invitation for a counterattack against North Vietnam.

The fact remains, however, that three PT boats did attack the destroyer *Maddox* while the latter was on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, and there seems no doubt that the Communist ships came out of a North Vietnamese base.

In these circumstances, the President's response, it seems to us, has been appropriate. He has instructed the Navy to continue its patrols in the gulf, to add another destroyer to the patrol, to maintain fighter plane cover over the destroyers, and, most significantly, to shoot with a view to destroying any attacking force. This last reflects a major policy change since previous instructions to the *Maddox* had been to defend itself if attacked, but not necessarily to destroy the attacker.

It seems unlikely that Hanoi, in the face of these beefed-up defensive measures, will permit any further attacks on American ships steaming in international waters. If the contrary should prove to be the case, however, the North Vietnamese would be solely responsible for the consequences—and we hope the consequences, if need for retaliation arises, will be severe.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times]

#### WARNING TO HANOI

President Johnson's response to the North Vietnamese attack on the destroyer *Maddox* contained the right mixture of firmness and restraint. No reprisals are being undertaken. But a strong diplomatic protest is being combined with military measures that should discourage Hanoi from further attacks, if any are planned. American naval forces in the Tonkin Gulf area are being strengthened. And they now have orders to destroy any forces that attack them, rather than merely to drive them off.

It must be hoped that this first attack by North Vietnam on the U.S. 7th Fleet was an error. South Vietnam's small naval forces have staged a number of raids on the North Vietnam coast. One theory in Washington is that the American destroyer, as seen on North Vietnamese radar, may have been taken for a similar South Vietnamese ship. Another theory is that the incident may simply have been the trigger-happy response of a North Vietnamese patrol, or its command, to an encounter with an American vessel near coastal waters. There have been other recent indications of North Vietnamese nervousness, following talk in Saigon of extending the war.

But the possibility cannot be excluded that the torpedo boat strike was intended to be the first of a series designed, perhaps, to test Washington's determination to continue aiding Saigon. If that be the case, it is essential that Hanoi realize immediately that it has opened a Pandora's box.

North Vietnam's capability of injuring the 7th Fleet is small. The power of the 7th Fleet to damage North Vietnam is incalculable. Since this must be evident, nothing is more vital than for Hanoi to be left in no doubt about the American intention to remain in the Tonkin Gulf and to continue supporting South Vietnam's military effort. The President's action should convey this message clearly.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post]

#### SOBER RESPONSE

The administration has responded with a reassuring blend of firmness and balance to North Vietnam's attack on the destroyer *Maddox*. President Johnson reaffirmed the shoot-back orders which had led the *Maddox* to return the fire of the three Vietnamese torpedo boats, and he beefed up the 7th Fleet patrol in the international waters off the Vietnamese coast. At the same time he directed that a protest be made through one of the indirect channels available to this country in the absence of formal relations with Hanoi.

This sequence, no less than the calmness with which it was undertaken, should leave no doubt in Hanoi's mind about the intention of the United States to claim and exercise its right to cruise in international waters and to defend itself against any further unprovoked attacks. The President's actions should also leave no doubt that the United States is determined to use its great power wisely, to husband its strength unless and until there is appropriate military and political occasion for its employment, and to avoid being tricked or provoked into imprudence.

Naturally, it will be asked if the American reaction was adequate to the needs of the situation. These needs are, in our view, limited: the protection of American ships and men and the discouragement of further attacks. Premier Khanh of South Vietnam feels the United States must also act so as not to appear a "paper tiger." One can guess that others, perhaps thinking of different ends than morale in South Vietnam, will join him in extending the list of needs which require satisfaction.

There is nothing sacred about the President's restraint, to be sure, but we feel it was tailored well to the specific challenge and that it leaves the United States in a strong position, politically and diplomatically, to take more drastic action later if that should become necessary. In our view, it was sensible to treat the attack as a single incident or uncertain purpose, and not as the deliberate start of a campaign to tease the American Navy or provoke a David-Goliath confrontation with the mighty 7th Fleet. Hanoi's persistent efforts to pry the United States out of the Vietnam conflict argue against the latter view. The Communists must also consider that the advantages which accrue to guerrillas on land are largely lacking; to marauders by sea.

The difficulty of reading Hanoi's mind on this score is enhanced by the peculiar half-light of signal and security which shines on, but fails to illuminate, many moves by both sides in Vietnam. Of all the moves so lighted, those connected with proposals to carry the war to the North are the most delicate. Over the weekend the North charged that two islands had been shelled by American and South Vietnamese ships and that a border village had been hit from the air by American planes crossing over from Laos. These accusations were promptly rebutted by American officials, but they contribute to the atmosphere of danger and ambiguity that enshrouds the attack on the *Maddox*.

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, Aug. 4, 1964]

#### ON WARNING

When the news of the North Vietnamese attack on the U.S.S. *Maddox* was flashed back to Washington early Sunday the administration decided to play the affair in low key. That posture was deliberate and studied. At home nerves already are on edge, and in southeast Asia tension is a standard component of the atmosphere. Because the raid on the patrolling destroyer was repulsed without American casualty, there was nothing to be gained from turning it into an emotional production. The news was made public in an announcement exemplary for its restraint, and in subsequent discussion the administration portrayed the attack as an incident of minor consequence.

There is a danger in such caution. It conceivably could encourage a rash enemy, thwarted once, to try again. If the North Vietnamese or any of their allies had found the American reaction deceptive, and had thought of new adventures, the President's fresh instructions to the Navy must make the prospect singularly unattractive. The White House has ordered the patrols in the

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Gulf of Tonkin to be continued with air cover and in doubled strength, and the Navy is directed to destroy any attacking force. In the future there can be no doubt as to the response.

The presence of American warships off the Communist coast is necessary to the defense of South Vietnam. It is a surveillance operation designed to detect any unusual movement of troops or supplies and to prevent any sudden Communist push. It is a perfectly legal patrol, and American ships have as much right to be there as in the high seas off Hampton Roads. No ship in international waters can be expected to endure attack without reprisal, and the Communists have been put on formal notice that American reprisal will be swift and devastating.

[From the Charlotte (N.C.) Observer, Aug. 6, 1964]

#### MAO FACING WAR-OR-PEACE CHOICE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

For the second time in less than 2 years the United States—and perhaps the world—stands on the brink of major war.

Now, as in October 1962, there is no need to talk of national unity or national determination. These we have in full measure.

All the political leaders who have so recently been engaged in partisan strife, from Senator BARRY GOLDWATER on down, have thrown their support to the President without hesitation in a critical hour. Congress is speedily backing his hand.

Ugly as they are, the Mississippi murders, the northern race riots and the growing bitterness between races and between political factions, all these have been suddenly thrust into the shadows by gunfire and bomb bursts in the Far East.

We wait and watch while the deployment and use of vast destructive powers move toward a showdown, link by link.

The chain began with an incident which, in a tactical sense, would scarcely have rated mention in the annals of World War II. North Vietnamese patrol boats made torpedo attacks on the *Maddox*, a 7th Fleet destroyer on solitary and lonely patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin off North Vietnam. The *Maddox* acquitted itself well, and with the help of naval aircraft, damaged and drove off the attacking craft.

President Johnson responded with the kind of caution which is imperative in world leaders in the nuclear age. He issued a warning and ordered air and surface reinforcements to the scene. It was barely possible that the attack had not been authorized by the government of Ho Chi Minh.

Tuesday a new flash came, and all doubt was blasted away. The *Maddox*, the destroyer *C. Turner Joy* and supporting aircraft had fought off another attack, sinking two enemy boats and damaging two.

In every capital of the world, all lingering questions about timidity or excessive restraint were answered by President Johnson's response. The punishing air attack which he ordered against the coastal installations of North Vietnam constituted but one thing—a heavy punch on the nose of Asian Communists.

But as the President stated, it was a "limited and fitting" response. While force was met with superior counterforce, the options for broadening the conflict now rest in the lap of Mao Tze-tung, the real originator of Communist aggression in southeast Asia.

Given the Chinese sensitivity to loss of face, it will not be an easy blow to absorb. Yet Mao has the instincts of a thousand Chinese warlords before him who knew that canny restraint, or even evasion, was sometimes necessary in the presence of great danger.

We can only hope that Chinese wisdom outweighs Chinese sensitivity in the critical hours and days ahead. For with all bluff gone, the issue is joined and a bloody and

destructive war is almost certain to come with any new Communist aggression.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times, Aug. 6, 1964]

#### U.S. ANSWER TO AGGRESSION

The U.S. response to what President Johnson called deliberate and unprovoked attacks on American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin was fitting in selectivity, proper in application and—given the clear, long-standing statement of U.S. intentions—inevitable in delivery.

There is not the slightest doubt that further attempts by the Communists to interfere with U.S. ships in international waters or U.S. planes in free skies will be met with retaliatory blows of equal promptness and severity.

As the President made plain in both his address to the nation Tuesday night and his talk at Syracuse University on Wednesday, the United States seeks no enlargement of the conflict. But this Nation is united in its belief that, in Mr. Johnson's words, "there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply."

We Americans have also the solemn compulsion to face the fact that the Communists, by their attack on American vessels in international waters, have themselves escalated the hostilities—an escalation we must meet. Thus the struggle in southeast Asia inevitably will become deadlier. At least now the cause is clear and we know what we are doing and why we do it.

The motives behind North Vietnam's deliberately aggressive acts are for the moment obscure. It must have been clear to both Hanoi and Peiping that shooting at U.S. ships would not frighten the 7th Fleet out of Tonkin Gulf. Nor, it should have been equally clear, would these acts be permitted to go unpunished.

The destruction of Red antiaircraft batteries in Laos 2 months ago after U.S. planes were shot at should have been ample proof of this.

Perhaps the North Vietnamese and Chinese were counting on U.S. retaliation as a lever to force a greater Soviet commitment to the Communist side, in the belief that regardless of doctrinal differences the Russians would stand with their fellow Communists in the event of a showdown with the United States.

Perhaps the attacks were part of an overall strategic plan, timed to coincide with stepped-up ground activities in South Vietnam.

Or perhaps the intent was simply to gain a propaganda victory by a quick humiliation of vaunted U.S. seapower.

In any case the North Vietnamese challenge has been answered, and the United States has shown that any further attempt to escalate the conflict will indeed result in what North Vietnam has called "grave consequences."

The Communists may believe that domestic U.S. politics precludes our taking effective action in southwest Asia. They are wrong. Senator GOLDWATER's statement Tuesday night and the response in Congress have shown that, as the President noted, "there are no parties—and there is no partisanship—when our peace or the peace of the world is imperiled by aggressors in any part of the world."

The crisis continues, and in the days ahead may intensify. U.S. strength in the area is being increased, a further earnest of our intentions to challenge any aggression. As the quickly mounted, multipronged strikes against the North Vietnamese naval installations proved, the United States has the power as well as the will to destroy selective targets on a controlled basis. Whether that power will be again used is very much up to the Communists.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, Aug. 6, 1964]

#### MR. STEVENSON SPEAKS FOR AMERICA

Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson's calm and lucid discussion before the United Nations yesterday of Communist torpedo attacks upon American warships off the coasts of North Vietnam provided the American people with an understanding of the crisis in southeast Asia which, until he spoke, had been sadly lacking.

President Johnson, in his address to the Nation Tuesday night and in his speech yesterday at Syracuse University, had asked unity in support of American firmness. He is more likely to get it now that Mr. Stevenson has stated the facts and explored the Communist motives.

As our spokesman told the U.N. Security Council, the attacks by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats in international waters—the first 30 miles offshore and the second more than 60—were senseless in themselves. But, said Mr. Stevenson, taken as part of a larger pattern, they disclosed a relentless determination by the Communists to subjugate the whole of the area by terror and force.

In this enterprise, he emphasized, the Ho Chi Minh regime in Hanoi could not be considered to be acting alone. It was teamed up with and supported by Communist China in a systematic violation of the Geneva accord of 1954 which was supposed to guarantee the peace of the countries which formerly composed French Indochina.

Mr. Stevenson said that these aggressors must be taught that their criminal methods would not pay. He said that the American reprisal air raids against Communist torpedo boat flotillas, their bases, and their oil depots were limited in intention, designed to correct the mistaken Communist impression that the United States would hold still for any brazen act of piracy.

If Peiping and Hanoi get the message and put into practice the agreements to which they are honorbound under the Geneva accord, the Ambassador said, southeast Asia could look forward to peace. But not until there are visible proofs that the Communists intend to cease their aggressions on land and sea and leave their neighbors in peace would the United States find it possible to withdraw its forces from that part of the world.

Mr. Stevenson repeated what President Johnson had said—that the United States does not want any wider war. He went beyond that to say that the United States does not want war at all, and there would be no war in southeast Asia if the Communists, in violation of their Geneva pledges, were not making it.

The Russian spokesman, who followed Mr. Stevenson, made the usual Soviet effort to befog the issue by calling for an appearance by North Vietnam before the Council. That country is not even a member of the United Nations, and the only purpose would be to fill the air with propaganda.

We have felt all along that the American people will support the policy of this or any other administration as long as they know what it is and what is at stake. Until now, the administration has created most of its difficulties in winning public confidence by its own failure to deal honestly with the people.

When its Pentagon spokesman has declared the existence of a policy of "news management" and has spoken of news as "weaponry" available to the President, adding that is the right of a government "to lie to save itself," it is hardly inviting the confidence of the people.

Mr. Stevenson has put Communist piratical acts and the systematic campaign to conquer South Vietnam and Laos in clear perspective. His unadorned recital of what has happened and is happening in southeast Asia will go a long way toward persuading



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the people that they now are informed about Communist objectives and the purpose of American counteraction. The Washington administration should be relieved that its brief was given such effective presentation.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Aug. 6, 1964]

## THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION

Everyone hopes the President's decisive move in ordering limited retaliation against North Vietnam will cause the Communists to abandon their forays in the Gulf of Tonkin and perhaps rethink their whole war effort. Yet, decisive though this U.S. reaction was, an aura of indecisiveness still clouds important questions on both sides of the struggle.

While Communist intentions can only be a matter of speculation, it may be that the Reds' own uncertainty about how far to push the war inspired the attacks on the 7th Fleet. At least it seems reasonable to interpret the attacks as a probing action designed to gauge the American response; for a long time no one could be sure how strongly the United States would prosecute the defense of South Vietnam. Now the Communists have part of the answer, though what they will make of it is something else again.

It is possible Communist China and its allies have decided now is the time for a showdown with the United States, but their own past behavior suggests otherwise. They did not push Korea to the bitter end. They did not mount an all-out attack on Taiwan. They did not pursue the harassment of Quemoy and Matsu to the point of major hostilities.

In Vietnam itself, of course, the Red tactic has been guerrilla warfare—incessant probes for weakness, if you like—rather than frontal assaults, and so far there has been relatively little evidence of direct Chinese participation. Since this type of warfare has been increasingly successful for them, it seems likely they will continue to step it up despite their stern rebuff in the Gulf of Tonkin.

That prospect leads us to the remaining areas of uncertainty about the U.S. position. It seems beyond doubt that the Government has decided to stay in Vietnam. It seems further that a decision has been reached to make a stronger stand—advocated, perhaps not so incidentally, by Senator Goldwater. Even before this week's naval engagements, it was planned to beef up the American forces in South Vietnam.

But if the war aim is to rid South Vietnam of the Communists once and for all, how is it to be accomplished? It certainly is not being accomplished now. Will it be necessary to intervene in much greater force and finally take over the direction of the war from the Vietnamese generals?

Anything along that line faces serious obstacles. Those generals are jealous of their prerogatives. The political instability in Saigon is so bad that talk is heard of yet another coup. Many of the people are far from dedicated to the fight against communism and indeed an undetermined number in the countryside are evidently sympathetic to the Communist Vietcong guerrillas.

Even if it is possible to extirpate the Communists with a major undertaking, it is difficult to see how future infiltration could be prevented. At any rate, it would seem to require a very large force to seal off the various and fluid borders, and the force might have to remain indefinitely, as in Korea.

Perhaps the Pentagon has effective answers to all these questions, but our Vietnamese involvement to date does not lend much support to that hope. Indeed, the history of that involvement has been marked by indecisiveness and confusion. The United States has drifted deeper and deeper into the war, without even appearing to know how to achieve its aims or always knowing what the aims were.

For some time, however, the course of events has itself narrowed the range of indecision. That is, the failure of small-scale "advisory" action has led to progressively fuller participation and mounting American casualties until now we are at the point of limited action against North Vietnam. Unless the Communists are deterred by that, it seems only too probable that the process will continue until we are committed to doing all that is necessary to get the Communists out.

Whatever actually happens, it is regrettable the United States is once again so enmeshed in so unpromising a venture. Yet we have gone so far that there appears no acceptable alternative. And if the President's order means the Government is at last on the road to firmness and decisiveness, it may be the best hope the circumstances offer.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Daily News, Aug. 6, 1964]

## BACKLASH IN TONKIN GULF

The North Vietnam Reds on Tuesday mounted their second PT boat attack on U.S. warships in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Thereupon, President Lyndon B. Johnson remembered that he is a Texan, or gave a thought to Senator BARRY GOLDWATER's repeated "Why not victory?" cracks, or both.

Anyway, the President ordered our Far East air and sea forces to backlash fittingly at the North Vietnam Reds.

Our men carried out this assignment yesterday, superbly.

U.S. naval aircraft destroyed or damaged 25 North Vietnamese PT boats, hashed up 5 torpedo bases, and wrecked the big oil storage depot at Vinh, in North Vietnam.

Cost to us: two planes and their pilots, may they rest in peace.

Unless the North Vietnamese take some more pokes at us, this backlash will be our last, according to present plans. The President said we want no wider war, in his dramatic TV-radio address to the Nation late Tuesday night.

The great majority of Americans, we believe, heartily approve all this; and we think Congress should endorse it after adequate debate.

And it is reassuring to see our Far East forces get set for whatever may grow out of the episode.

North Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh is obviously hopping mad over this unexpected single dealt by us to his wispy whiskers. He may try to get hunk; Red China may try to help him.

Both of the Communist governments' press and radio mouthpieces are making big talk about how they will soon be coming around to get revenge for yesterday's U.S. air strikes.

In that event, it may be our heaven-sent good fortune to liquidate not only Ho Chi Minh but Mao Tse-tung's Red mob at Peking as well. Presumably with an important assist from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan (Formosa).

[From the Providence Journal, Aug. 6, 1964]  
"WE ARE ONE NATION, UNITED AND INDIVISIBLE"

In the short but calmly strong address in Syracuse, President Johnson restated this country's simple formula for the restoration of peace in southeast Asia. He also made it abundantly clear that in the current crisis, there are no parties and no partisanship dividing the American people.

What Mr. Johnson offered as a formula for peace in southeast Asia is essentially the same formula to which President Eisenhower and the late President Kennedy dedicated their efforts: the governments in that part of the globe ought to follow international agreements already supposed to prevail.

The President urged the governments there to leave each other alone, to settle their

differences peacefully, and to "devote their talents to bettering the life of their peoples by working against poverty and disease and ignorance." "Peace requires that the existing agreements in the area be honored."

"To any who may be tempted to support or to widen the present aggression" by North Vietnam, he said, "I say this. There is no threat to any peaceful power from the United States, but there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply. That is what is meant by the action" taken by the Navy.

Having made plain "to the people of all nations" the reasons for this Nation's course of action in recent days, the President made it equally plain that, for Americans, this is no time for politicking with crisis. Congressional support of the President yesterday dramatized this fact.

"Let no friend needlessly fear and no foe vainly hope that this is a nation divided in this political year," he said. "Our free elections—our full and free debate—are America's strengths, not America's weaknesses \* \* \*. We are one nation, united and indivisible; united and indivisible we shall remain."

There was strength of purpose and calmness of language in the President's brief message. But there also was clarity and eloquence. There will be plenty to debate in the coming campaign, but in the face of savage threat to "our peace and the peace of the world," there is solid national unity.

[From the New York Journal-American, Aug. 6, 1964]

## ACTION IN THE EAST

President Johnson has acted with appropriate firmness and dispatch in ordering retaliatory action against North Vietnam for its attacks on U.S. naval vessels on the high seas.

There is no doubt the overwhelming sentiment of the Nation is behind him. This was swiftly expressed in terms of bipartisan congressional support and included a special statement from Senator BARRY GOLDWATER.

The salient fact of this grave development in the Far East is this: the Communists have changed the ground rules of the continuing struggle in the Far East—and now cannot unchange them. Nor should the United States, in its show of firmness, seek to unchange them.

Before the attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on American destroyers patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin, the "rules" were clear. They specified that North Vietnam was a supplier of men and arms to Red guerrillas in South Vietnam. They specified that the United States would train and advise the forces of South Vietnam in operations against those guerrillas.

Now the North Vietnamese Government, or perhaps the Peking Government, has apparently decided on a broader confrontation. The manipulators have thus forced the United States to raise its own sights, too. And it is too early to foresee the consequences of this sudden escalation of war in the Far East.

However, now that our sights are thus adjusted, perhaps the issue of quelling Communist imperialism in the area is closer at hand than before. Perhaps now the vast power of the United States will be brought to bear to enforce peace in the Far East.

The aim of the United States in its blows against North Vietnam is not to spread conflict and not to engage in a major war, nor should it be.

The aim is peace—peace instead of unprovoked assault on the high seas, peace instead of armed attempts to overthrow legitimate governments and peace instead of the outlaw behavior of regimes contemptuous of the fate of millions.

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[From the New York Post, Aug. 6, 1964]

## THE U.N. AND VIETNAM

Clearly the United States does not seek a wider war. Let us hope Asia's Communists do not either. The initial Soviet response, as given by Tass, was quite restrained. While deploring U.S. "aggressive actions," the statement avoided committing Moscow to doing anything about them.

At the U.N., the Soviet delegate was equally restrained. His request that a representative of North Vietnam be invited to participate was doubly significant.

It served to suggest that Moscow did not know what its Communist brethren in Asia were up to. It also set up interesting possibilities of dividing Hanoi from Peiping.

Whatever Russia's motives, there is every reason to invite North Vietnam.

"It is a solemn responsibility," said President Johnson Tuesday night when he disclosed an air strike was in progress, "to have, to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States."

That awesome strength makes it all the more baffling that the North Vietnamese should be seeking to provoke us. Direct contact with the representatives of Hanoi may shed some light on this.

North Vietnam may not like our vessels' presence in the Tonkin Gulf. The Communists have always been sensitive about their frontiers—almost to the point of paranoia. But neither does the United States exactly welcome electronically equipped Soviet vessels carrying on continuous surveillance off Cape Kennedy.

But we put up with it. The right of ships to voyage on the high seas is incontestable. The response of the United States was wholly predictable. The question remains: Why did Hanoi do it?

The more basic question, however, is where are we heading in Vietnam? Are we being sucked into a dark tunnel from which there may be no egress?

Ambassador Stevenson eloquently stated our case. But it was a limited brief, largely restricted to justifying our air strikes under the right of self-defense set forth in article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

We owed this explanation to the U.N. But the U.N. should be more than a sounding board.

The smaller nations, those not directly involved in the dispute, and therefore capable of some detachment, should be encouraged to come forward with proposals for mediation, perhaps conciliation.

Several weeks ago U Thant called for a new Geneva conference. If the parties involved in the war could reach an agreement, Thant said, the U.N. could play a role in seeing that the agreement was carried out. "Even at this late hour," he suggested, means might be found to end the war.

Nothing happened. The United States is again perilously close to a major military venture on the Asian mainland. Surely before we venture further, a major effort should be made to open up channels of communication with our adversaries.

"Blessed are the peacemakers," said President Johnson in June, quoting the Bible in a foreign policy speech that coupled firmness with an olive branch.

Provocative as the Communists have been, that still remains true.

## EDITORIAL REACTIONS TO ASIAN CONFLICT

(Following are excerpts from newspaper editorial comments on the situation in Vietnam.)

## EAST

[From the New York News (Independent)]

## Backlash in Tonkin Gulf

Unless the North Vietnamese take some more pokes at us, this backlash will be our

last, according to present plans. The President said we want no wider war, in his dramatic TV-radio address to the Nation late Tuesday night. The great majority of Americans, we believe, heartily approve all this; and we think Congress should endorse it after adequate debate.

And it is reassuring to see our Far East forces get set for whatever may grow out of the episode.

It may be our heaven-sent good fortune to liquidate not only Ho Chi Minh but Mao Tse-tung's Red mob at Peiping as well, presumably with an important assist from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan.

[From the Herald Tribune (Independent Republican)]

## The right response

Whoever planned the torpedo-boat attacks, for whatever purpose, stand warned. If they were probing the intentions of the United States, of Red China, of the Soviet Union, they at least know that the United States will resist aggression, and that it has the capability of doing so.

The controlled impact of the American counterblow has clearly made its impact on the world. From its friends this country has received such congratulations as that of Japan (very directly concerned with the problem of Communist expansion in Asia) and such encouragement as that of Britain in the Security Council. From the Soviet Union has come denunciation—but it is oddly perfunctory.

[From the Journal-American (Independent)]

## Action in the East

President Johnson has acted with appropriate firmness and dispatch in ordering retaliatory action against North Vietnam for its attacks on U.S. naval vessels on the high seas. There is no doubt the overwhelming sentiment of the Nation is behind him.

The salient fact of this grave development in the Far East is this: The Communists have changed the ground rules of the continuing struggle in the Far East—and now cannot unchange them. Nor should the United States, in its show of firmness, seek to unchange them.

Now the North Vietnamese Government, or perhaps the Peiping Government, has apparently decided on a broader confrontation.

[From Newsday (Independent)]

## Mild response

The North Vietnamese and their Chinese preceptors should now realize that we mean what we say: that further aggression will be countered by further, carefully directed force, and that the peace of southeast Asia can be reestablished overnight only if the Communists will cease meddling in the affairs of small nations that want to live at peace.

The purpose of the United States is to demonstrate that we are willing, as the President says, to face with courage and to meet with strength this challenge precisely as we did in Greece and Turkey, Berlin and Korea, Lebanon and Cuba.

On that platform for national defense, and for peace, the whole country can unite, regardless of political differences.

[From the Post (Independent)]

## The U.N. and Vietnam

North Vietnam may not like our vessels' presence in the Tonkin Gulf. The Communists have always been sensitive about their frontiers—almost to the point of paranoia.

But neither does the United States exactly welcome electronically equipped Soviet vessels carrying on continuous surveillance off Cape Kennedy. But we put up with it. The right of ships to voyage on the high seas is incontestable. The response of the United States was wholly predictable.

The question remains, why did Hanoi do it? The more basic question, however, is: Where are we heading in Vietnam? Are we being sucked into a dark tunnel from which there may be no egress?

The smaller nations, those not directly involved in the dispute and therefore capable of some detachment, should be encouraged to come forward with proposals for mediation, perhaps conciliation.

## NEW ENGLAND

[From the Boston Herald]

## Test of U.S. policy

The sudden flareup of hot war in Vietnam provides a vital test of the flexible defense strategy favored by the Kennedy-Johnson administration.

The next move is up to the Reds. If they seek a wider war, they can have it. Because of our flexible strength, because we are able to answer first in a limited and fitting way, the chances of avoiding a major showdown are good. The flexible defense strategy has given us options which may make a life-or-death difference for our generation.

[From the Hartford Courant (Republican)]

## Red China blamed

As in Korea, when this country last stood up against military aggression, we may expect a world that often wonders about our maturity and responsibility to support our sharp but limited retaliation. Let us hope United Nations Security Council understands and does not temporize with a great threat to the peace it is its duty to preserve.

Most likely explanation of what has happened is that this is Red China's response to the American decision to step up its aid to South Vietnam and to all southeast Asia if need be, by way of countering increasingly successful North Vietnamese pressure southward.

## MIDDLE ATLANTIC

[From the Newark Evening News]

## After the storm

Whatever the intention, the attack and the precisely tailored response it has drawn serve to reinforce the conditions that must prevail before a realistic settlement can be attempted. Neither the United States nor any of its allies need, or will, settle for less freedom and more Communist encroachment in Southeast Asia. Negotiation is possible. It is desirable. But it must be more firmly rooted than in 1954 or 1962. Its results must be susceptible to more effective enforcement.

One dividend to be derived from the conflict in the Gulf of Tonkin is that the United States has demonstrated its capability of dealing with a variety of eventualities. However much they may rant and threaten in the dangerous days that lie ahead, our Communist adversaries cannot lose sight of that fact.

[From Philadelphia Bulletin (Independent)]

The rapid concentration of our military might in the southeast-Asia area for a major show of force lends great credence to the United States determination. The crisis in Vietnam has by no means ended, and, as Secretary Rusk said, the situation remains very explosive, but it seems to be dwindling, thanks to the clarity and forcefulness of our response.

## SOUTH

[From the Washington Post]

## Gratitude for Johnson

President Johnson has earned the gratitude of the free world as well as of the Nation for his careful and effective handling of the Vietnam crisis. The paramount need was to show the North Vietnamese aggressors their self-defeating folly in ignoring an unequivocal American warning and again attacking the American Navy on the high seas.

To a world sensitive to the uses of power by an American President, the crisis—the first major foreign-policy crisis faced by President Johnson—has found him not wanting in toughness or in nuance.

[From the Star (Independent)]

*"Paper tiger" rebutted*

President Johnson's order to the 7th Fleet to bomb North Vietnamese PT boats and the facilities from which they operate is fully justified. What counteraction, if any, will come from the other side, remains to be seen. If they react forcibly, however it would be logical to expect some enlargement of the war against South Vietnam.

Our response to the PT-boat attacks should disabuse the Communist mind of the "paper tiger" fiction. But if the war in the South is stepped up we should not be content merely to hold our ground. Our purpose, as contrasted to Korea, should be to destroy the enemy and the sources from which his attacks are being mounted.

[From the Atlanta Constitution (Independent Democrat)]

*A test of will*

The Communists apparently have decided to test our resolve, in southeast Asia and even the Congo, during this presidential election year. Quick action by both political parties and approval by GOP Nominee GOLDWATER shows there is no partisanship when the Nation's security is at stake.

We seek an honorable solution without war and welcome U.N. help, but we cannot negotiate the wanton violation of solemn treaty agreements to which we are a party.

[From the Journal (Independent Democrat)]

*We have made it clear*

We have made our move in southeast Asia. We have replied with bombs on North Vietnam bases to deliberate attacks on our naval vessels in international waters. We have made it clear to the Reds in that part of the world that we have been pushed far enough.

Here we have done the sensible thing. It also happens to have been the honorable thing. Somewhere and some time a line had to be drawn. The Nation has been aware of this for a long time. It is a relief that this line finally has been drawn.

[From the Baltimore Sun (Independent Democrat)]

*There was no choice*

It is not an easy thing to lose even a small fraction of the military power available to the Commander in Chief, but in this case there was no choice. In striking back at a time of grave provocation, the United States hoped not to spread the fighting but to pinch it off before it got out of hand.

The key to peace in Asia is hidden in Communist China, in the course it may essay alone, or with the encouragement of Moscow. Whatever the dangers, the United States will face them with the courage possessed only by those who are both free and strong.

[From the Louisville Courier-Journal]

*War can be averted*

The convincing show of the national unity on the war threat in Asia, met with speed, wisdom, and restraint by President Johnson, strengthening the possibility that a major war with Red China can be averted.

It leaves no doubt in Communist minds anywhere that if war is what they want, war is what they will get—a certainty that should bring even Peiping's fanatics to their senses unless they remain irresponsibly addicted to the opiate that only a major war can head the Sino-Soviet rift.

**SOUTHWEST**

[From the Houston Post]

*Goldwater is quoted*

There can be no question of support for the President's action. This support was

aptly expressed by Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, with whom the President talked before telling the people what he planned to do.

Emphasizing his support of the President's action, the Republican presidential nominee said, "We cannot allow the American flag to be shot at anywhere on earth if we are to retain our respect and prestige."

Hopefully, the quick and decisive action by the United States will convince the world that we will carry out our commitments to all free people without seeking any wider war. Certainly the prompt support of Senator GOLDWATER should erase any doubts.

**MIDWEST**

[From the Chicago Sun-Times (Independent)]

Whether events in Vietnam develop into full-scale warfare involving the United States now depends on what the Communists do next.

Whatever their motive for the suicidal attacks on American ships in international waters, they and all the world have learned—once again—that the United States does not become weak when divided internally by a presidential election campaign.

[From the Chicago Tribune (Independent Republican)]

*Unity is foreseen*

Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson's calm and lucid discussion before the United Nations yesterday of Communist torpedo attacks upon American warships off the coasts of North Vietnam provided the American people with an understanding of the crisis in southeast Asia which, until he spoke, had been sadly lacking.

President Johnson, in his address to the Nation Tuesday night and in his speech yesterday at Syracuse University, had asked unity in support of American firmness. He is more likely to get it now that Mr. Stevenson has stated the facts and explored the Communist motives.

[From the Milwaukee Journal (Independent)]

*Appeal for restraint*

It may be that the North Vietnamese, with the backing of Communist China, were testing the American will. If so, they have their answer.

There is some danger that this country may tend to overreact to North Vietnamese slings because of our political situation. President Johnson has been under attack for what opponents call a "no win" policy in southeast Asia. He has been unwisely urged to escalate the war.

Under such circumstances, a President can be handicapped in making vital decisions. President Johnson will need courage and patience and restraint to keep the Nation from the wider war that he—and all who realize what modern war is—wish to avoid.

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Independent Democrat)]

*The guilt is shared*

The two Communist naval attacks on units of the U.S. 7th Fleet, and the swift and devastating U.S. reply, need not and should not bring about an "escalation" of the struggle in Indochina.

This country plans no further belligerent action unless there is another attack; President Johnson and U.S. Ambassador Stevenson have made clear we want "no wider war."

It is true that if the Communists would abide by the Geneva political settlements peace and independence would be assured and military power could be withdrawn.

But the West is not guiltless in this respect, and there is not likely to be an end of the conflict short of a negotiated political settlement guaranteed by the big powers and, perhaps, supervised by the U.N.

[From the Cleveland Plain Dealer (Independent Democrat)]

*Warnings to Reds*

North Vietnam's acts of aggression against U.S. ships in the Tonkin Gulf have been given a fitting response.

President Johnson, speaking yesterday in Syracuse, has solemnly warned there will be "no immunity to reply" from further aggression.

The meaning of the President's words is clear. There is no excuse for Hanoi or Peiping to misunderstand them.

[From the Indianapolis Star (Independent)]

*The proper reaction*

President Johnson's decision to use full military action against Communist aggression in southeastern Asia is the proper reaction to the events of recent hours.

The attacks on U.S. naval craft in the Gulf of Tonkin appear to have been calculated provocations. To react in any way suggestive of fear or hesitation would simply invite more attacks. As long as we are involved in such a conflict, the only thing to do is try to win it.

**MOUNTAIN STATES**

[From the Denver Post (Independent)]

*Nixon's view backed*

We are inclined to agree with Richard Nixon that these attacks were set up by the Chinese Reds to test U.S. reactions during the election campaign.

The Communists probably expected the Nation to be so split that the President would be afraid to react decisively to such attacks. This phenomenon of our political parties' interrupting bitter partisan warfare to close ranks whenever there is an outside threat to the Nation has baffled Europeans and Asians for years. But it is a rock-hard fact of American life.

**PACIFIC**

[From the Los Angeles Times (Independent Republican)]

*Conflict grows deadlier*

Communists, by their attack on American vessels in international waters, have themselves escalated the hostilities—an escalation we must meet. Thus the struggle in southeast Asia inevitably will become deadlier. At least now the cause is clear and we know what we are doing and why we do it.

[From the Portland Oregonian (Independent Republican)]

*Old, familiar situation*

If the facts are as represented, the American response was justified, even necessary. What now, of the Communist response? Red China has a defense treaty with North Vietnam. So has the Soviet Union.

There is the possibility that the PT-boat attacks were designed to trigger the certain American retaliation against North Vietnam to provoke and force China's entrance to the war in southeast Asia. With each side charging aggression, the old, familiar situation which has led to other big wars has been created.

[From the San Francisco Chronicle (Republican)]

*Answer to Peiping*

The answer has been given. In the words of President Johnson it was an unmistakable "positive" answer, and Peiping now knows that the U.S. forces in Vietnam can and will strike back effectively if attacked.

The principle is incontrovertible, and the measures thus far employed under it were sound and no doubt inevitable. It is the hope of world peace that they were also effective.

[From the Seattle Times (Independent)]

*Affront to U.S. dignity*

No self-respecting nation could have permitted without retaliation the indignity of



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a second armed attack on its vessels in the face of a protest over the first such attack—least of all that nation which bears the principal burden of restraining Communist aggressors in all parts of the world.

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 7, 1964]

## AS THE TENSION CONTINUES

One inevitable consequence of momentous events in southeast Asia the past few days is the necessity for American foreign policy experts to reassess the entire situation in that part of the world.

Although the basic U.S. objective—to preserve freedom and repel Communist aggression—remains the same, there will need to be major revisions in the planning and execution of methods to achieve the goal.

The Communists should have no delusions now about the overwhelming superiority of American naval power in the Far East—but on land it is a different story. For this reason, the great peril is that the Reds will step up their offensive in the jungles of South Vietnam and Laos where American destroyers, aircraft carriers and jet planes can't help much.

Meanwhile, as fresh policy studies proceed, and the U.S. military buildup in the Far East is accelerated in preparation for any eventuality, it is important for Americans to remain united behind President Johnson in this crisis and to be wary of any wishful thinking that the danger has passed. The North Vietnam dragon is nursing humiliating wounds. "Saving face" is very important in that part of the world.

Russia, apparently, is not anxious to encourage North Vietnamese attacks against the United States, as indicated by the relatively mild nature of official Soviet words emanating from Moscow and the United Nations. Red China, of course, is another matter. Peiping is always unpredictable. Mao is always dangerous.

Under existing circumstances it was shocking to have unity in Congress rudely shattered by Senator MORSE, of Oregon, a maverick Member of the President's own party, who charges that the trouble in southeast Asia "is as much the doing of the United States as it is the doing of North Vietnam." Mr. MORSE ignores all the facts in the case—notably the prolonged Communist aggression against Laos and South Vietnam and the unprovoked Red attacks on U.S. warships on the high seas.

In contrast to the ill-advised outburst by Senator MORSE was the prompt support given to President Johnson by Senator GOLDWATER in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation that is so essential in this grave time.

Facing up to all the new implications inherent in the radically altered situation in southeast Asia is a task that requires the best in all of us. This applies especially to those in positions of public responsibility who should dedicate themselves unstintingly to the task of doing whatever may need to be done to win the struggle for peace and freedom.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 7, 1964]

## AS OTHERS SEE THE TONKIN GULF

The Washington Post:

"President Johnson has earned the gratitude of the free world as well as of the Nation for his careful and effective handling of the Vietnam crisis. The paramount need was to show the North Vietnamese aggressors their self-defeating folly in ignoring an unequivocal American warning and again attacking the American Navy on the high seas. This Mr. Johnson did by means of a severe but measured response deftly fitted to the aggression: retaliation against the boats and bases used in the attack \* \* \*.

"Most immediately, the reprisal rendered obsolete the old terms of the debate on whether to carry the guerrilla war in South Vietnam back to the aggressors in the north.

"To a capital and a world sensitive to the uses of power by an American President, the crisis—the first major foreign-policy crisis faced by President Johnson—has found him not wanting in toughness or in nuance. But the crisis has also pointed up the office of the Presidency as the single center of control and responsibility for American power.

"Military measures were only a part of President Johnson's response. He coordinated them with the other constituencies and communities of which he is the leader. He asked and got from Senator GOLDWATER a promise of nonpartisanship. The Senator, like the patriot he is, instantly forsook politics and stood by his side."

Pittsburgh Post Gazette:

"In both his Tuesday announcement of the attack order and in his speech Wednesday at Syracuse University, the President stressed the limited nature of the American response to the gunboat attacks and the desire of the United States to avoid the tragedy of a wider war. Yet no one in Washington has any way of anticipating the thinking of officials in Peiping.

"In view of the serious danger to world peace from the broadened hostilities in southeast Asia, the United States has properly called for an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council to deal with the crisis. Hopefully, through the good offices of that agency and the good sense of responsible officials in various capitals and chancelleries, the ugly Vietnamese war can be kept from triggering an immeasurably more destructive wider conflict.

The Boston Globe:

"President Johnson, speaking at Syracuse University Wednesday, enunciated the proposition that 'aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed.' This striking phrase reiterated a principle that has long lain at the heart of American foreign policy and at the core of every international crisis, however complex it has seemed.

"Peiping, with an unsolved food problem, would like an excuse to move into the 'rice bowl' of Indochina. It might hope by a mass attack to leave the United States only the alternative of giving way or fighting a major—perhaps an all-out—war. Success would give the Chinese an immense advantage in the competition with Russia for the leadership of world communism.

"This country has moved fast to dampen any such hopes."

Christian Science Monitor: "Premier Nguyen Khanh of South Vietnam makes sense.

"He points out that President Johnson warned the Asian Communists against the 'very dangerous game' they have been playing in southeast Asia. And that the Communist answer has now come. It is intensified war—both in South Vietnam and in torpedo boat attacks on an American destroyer off the North Vietnam coast.

"The immediate response from President Johnson was being announced in Washington even as the South Vietnamese Premier spoke in Saigon. It was the obvious response. The Navy was instructed to destroy any such attacker in future.

"The United States is unavoidably going in further. The only questions are when and how far."

The Times, London: "The next step is left to the Communists, and in attempting to assess what it may be there are three guiding thoughts. The Americans, having made their counteraction, have issued no threats or ultimatums. The Communists are not forced against a wall. Secondly, the American reinforcements are enough to warn the Communists that any extension of the war would

be highly costly and dangerous to them, as well as to others. And the third point: the Americans have, very rightly, put the whole matter to the Security Council."

The Guardian, Manchester: "The war will be won or lost in the South; and it would continue there if every military base in the North were pulverized. In fact, any extension of the war is likely to make the Vietcong more determined."

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: "The American revenge came unexpectedly fast and sharply \* \* \* but still the retaliation of Washington did not get out of control. That is important."

Aurore, Paris: "In the Gulf of Tonkin it is Mao who is maneuvering with his docile satellite of North Vietnam and it is Khrushchev who is the target. How will Khrushchev get out of it?"

Vienna Volksblatt: "If Johnson rattles his saber a little it is mainly to show the electorate that he is not the defeatist and friend of Communists that GOLDWATER has made him out to be."

Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo: "The United Nations is urged to act promptly in order to prevent the present conflict from developing into a full-fledged war."

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 7, 1964]

## "BE IT RESOLVED—"

As Commander in Chief, President Johnson could, and did, order retaliatory action against North Vietnam for its unprovoked attacks upon American ships. That was a logical extension of the right of self-defense; speed was of the essence. But the continuing crisis in southeast Asia may call for other, more elaborate measures. It is sound policy to provide congressional indorsement in advance for such steps, both as an expression of the role of the legislature in the American system of government and, at least equally important, as a demonstration of American determination.

This dual role will be performed by the joint resolution to be voted today by both the Senate and House, approving the President's action and empowering him to "take all necessary steps including the use of armed force," to aid America's allies, to repel attacks upon U.S. forces, and prevent further aggression.

Red China has made it very clear that it considers North Vietnam's cause its own. It is very far from clear just what Peiping intends to do about it. But in the light of past history (in Korea, on the Indian border, along the Formosa Strait) it would be folly to brush the Red Chinese menaces aside. It would also be folly to assume that if action does not immediately follow on the threat the latter is empty.

Red China has not always made good its boasts. But it has hit hard in almost every case. It brags now that Indochina presents a far better field of military action for its teeming divisions than the Korean Peninsula, while no body of water separates China from Indochina as was the case with Quemoy, Matsu, and Formosa.

The United States and its allies, then, would do well to regard the threat from Peiping as a time bomb, which will only go off when the Red Chinese want it to. The best method of preventing an explosion is to impress, as strongly as possible, upon Mao Tse-tung and his band, that this country is prepared, physically and morally, to meet any thrust.

The joint resolution gives the President full backing for any preparations that the Armed Forces may require in the danger area. It does so publicly and unequivocally. At the same time, it gives voice to the American will. Indeed, it might be said that the most significant part of the measure is the formal preamble, which in this context is full of meaning: "Now, therefore, be it resolved."

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the great statesman from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING].

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, yesterday, I made my views on the pending resolution known on the floor of the Senate, and they appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. There is no need to add to them, except to reaffirm them. It is a matter of deep regret for me that I cannot, on this major issue, support the resolution drafted by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in response to a message from the President to the Congress requesting such support.

I believe that President Johnson in his more than 8 months in office has shown himself to be a great President. I find myself in warm accord with most of his actions and declarations of policy. I intend to campaign for him after the adjournment of Congress.

Regrettably, I find myself in disagreement with his southeast Asian policy, and have repeatedly voiced my disagreement in the Chamber. The serious events of the past few days, the attack by North Vietnamese vessels on American warships and our reprisal, strikes me as the inevitable and foreseeable concomitant and consequence of U.S. unilateral military aggressive policy in southeast Asia.

I consider the action of the North Vietnamese in attacking our vessels as utterly stupid and outrageous, and our prompt retaliation justifiable and proper. But this is precisely the kind of episode that our unilateral and aggressive policy in southeast Asia would inevitably bring forth. That incident has in turn brought about the President's message and the responding resolution by Congress.

If this resolution merely affirmed its approval of the President's declared policy and action to respond to attacks on our fleet when in international waters, as he has responded, that would be one thing. I would gladly approve of such a resolution, as I approve of his action. But this resolution now before us goes far beyond that. It not only endorses all our Government has done to date in southeast Asia, but also gives the President a blank check, not merely to do whatever he likes in South Vietnam, but, to quote the text of the resolution:

To take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

That is, in effect, a pre-dated declaration of war, if and when the Executive chooses, and war not merely in South Vietnam but in all southeast Asia.

Is that what the Congress intends?

That is what the Congress is doing.

We now are about to authorize the President if he sees fit to move our Armed Forces—that is, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps—not only into South Vietnam, but also into North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and of course the authorization includes all the rest of the SEATO nations.

That means sending our American boys into combat in a war in which we

have no business, which is not our war, into which we have been misguidedly drawn, which is steadily being escalated. This resolution is a further authorization for escalation unlimited.

I am opposed to sacrificing a single American boy in this venture. We have lost far too many already.

I have repeatedly expressed my view which I now reiterate. That we should have been waging peace with the same energy and fervor with which we have been waging war.

I have asked, and ask again now, that instead of multiplying our Armed Forces and the resulting casualties, we request a cease-fire and seek, instead of hostile military action, a peacekeeping United Nations police force. I should be happy to see Americans as a part of that peacekeeping police force.

This procedure, as I have pointed out, has been successfully used on the Israel-Egypt border, and in the Congo. Why not try it in South Vietnam?

My time being short, I can only call attention to my earlier statement on this resolution and repeat that I cannot in good conscience support the pending resolution, which opens the door to unlimited unilateral war by our country in an area and for a cause which pose no threat to our national security, and in which no more American lives should be sacrificed.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, how much time remains to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon has 8 minutes remaining.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I shall not use all of that time. I wish only to correct a misapprehension that I was not able to cover in my speech earlier, but I wish to add one further point which I overlooked.

I was commenting on a Washington Post editorial which cited the Cuban resolution as being comparable to the pending resolution.

Last night, I pointed out that they are quite different resolutions.

I ask Senators to turn to page 17845 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of August 6, where I inserted the Cuban resolution. It will be recalled that in discussion of the Cuban resolution the point was made, both in committee and on the floor of the Senate, that the resolution differed from the Middle East resolution and the Formosa resolution, in that it made no reference whatever to authorizing any power to the President of the United States. It was because of that that we were able to get support for the resolution. At the time of the Cuban resolution if there had been an attempt to give war making authority to the President, the resolution would not have received the votes it did. Some Senators announced that they would not support the resolution with such a clause in it. If we examine the resolution, we see that all it does is to set out the opinion of Congress as to what American foreign policy should be, vis-a-vis Cuba.

That is quite a different thing from giving the President any authority for a predated declaration of war in respect to Cuba, as this resolution does in respect to Asiatic problems.

I believe that history will record that we have made a great mistake in subverting and circumventing the Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8, thereof by means of this resolution.

As I argued earlier today at some length, we are in effect giving the President of the United States warmaking powers in the absence of a declaration of war.

I believe that to be a historic mistake. I believe that within the next century, future generations will look with dismay and great disappointment upon a Congress which is now about to make such a historic mistake.

Our constitutional rights are no better than the preservation of our procedural guarantees under the Constitution.

We are seeking by indirection to circumvent article I, section 8 of the Constitution. Senators know as well as I do that we cannot obtain a test before the U.S. Supreme Court of that attempt to grant warmaking powers to a President by a resolution because under this set of facts we cannot hail the President of the United States before the Supreme Court for a determination of such a question as to the unconstitutionality of the pending resolution.

I am sorry, but I believe that Congress is not protecting the procedural, constitutional rights of the American people, under article I, section 8 of the Constitution.

If the President of the United States, after Pearl Harbor, could exercise his inherent power in defense of this country, as every President has the right to do and then come before the Congress and ask for a declaration of war as Roosevelt did, then the pending regulation is not necessary. The President can come to Congress and ask for a declaration of war, as was done against Japan at that time. The President of the United States can now do likewise, if the time ever comes when the President must ask for a declaration of war against a country in Asia or anywhere else.

For the reasons I have set forth, I shall vote against the resolution.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] is necessarily absent today but has asked that he be recorded in favor of the resolution supporting the President's policies in Vietnam. The Senator would state, if he were here, that the United States was the victim of unnecessary provocation and that the United States was compelled to respond and, he would add, that it is essential for the country to unite behind the President at this time of crisis.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of House Joint Resolution 1145, as a substitute for the Senate joint resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate a joint resolution coming over from the House, which will be stated by title.

The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 1145) was read twice by its title.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the House joint resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution is open to amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to a third reading, and was read the third time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call may be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the House joint resolution.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution having been read the third time, the question is, Shall the joint resolution pass?

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON] and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON] and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] are absent because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON] the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE], the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] would each vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] is necessarily absent and, if present and voting, would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 88, nays 2, as follows:

[No. 520 Leg.]

YEAS—88

Alken	Bennett	Byrd, Va.
Allott	Bible	Byrd, W. Va.
Bartlett	Boggs	Carlson
Bayh	Brewster	Case
Beall	Burdick	Church

Cooper  
Cotton  
Curtis  
Dirksen  
Dodd  
Dominick  
Douglas  
Eastland  
Ellender  
Ervin  
Fong  
Fulbright  
Goldwater  
Gore  
Hart  
Hartke  
Hayden  
Hickenlooper  
Hill  
Holland  
Hruska  
Humphrey  
Inouye  
Jackson  
Javits

Jordan, N.C.  
Jordan, Idaho  
Keating  
Kuchel  
Lausche  
Long, Mo.  
Long, La.  
Magnuson  
Mansfield  
McCarthy  
McClellan  
McGee  
McGovern  
McIntyre  
McNamara  
Mecham  
Metcalf  
Miller  
Monroney  
Morton  
Moss  
Mundt  
Muskie  
Nelson  
Neuberger

Pastore  
Pearson  
Pell  
Proxmire  
Randolph  
Ribicoff  
Robertson  
Russell  
Salinger  
Saltonstall  
Simpson  
Smathers  
Smith  
Sparkman  
Stennis  
Thurmond  
Tower  
Walters  
Williams, N.J.  
Williams, Del.  
Young, N. Dak.  
Young, Ohio

NAYS—2

Gruening

Morse

NOT VOTING—10

Anderson  
Cannon  
Clark  
Edmondson

Johnston  
Kennedy  
Scott  
Symington

Talmadge  
Yarborough

So the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 1145) was passed as follows:

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

The preamble was agreed to.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senate Joint Resolution 189 be indefinitely postponed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## LEASING OF REAL PROPERTY BY POSTMASTER GENERAL

Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House on H.R. 9653.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 9653) to extend the authority of the Postmaster General to enter into leases of real property for periods not exceeding 30 years, and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. McNAMARA. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Michigan.

The motion was agreed to.

## TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

By unanimous consent, the following routine business was transacted:

### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 1057) to promote the cause of criminal justice by providing for the representation of defendants who are financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in criminal cases in the courts of the United States.

### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

#### AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE ACT

A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Federal Crop Insurance Act, as amended (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

#### REPORT ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations), transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on military construction, Air National Guard (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

#### DISPOSAL OF CHROMIUM METAL, ACID GRADE FLUORSPAR, AND SILICON CARBIDE FROM THE SUPPLEMENTAL STOCKPILE

A letter from the Administrator, General Services Administration, Washington, D.C., transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize the disposal of chromium metal, acid grade fluor spar, and silicon carbide from the supplemental stockpile (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Armed Services.

#### REPORT OF DIRECTORS OF FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES, INC.

A letter from the Commissioner, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., transmitting, pursu-

ant to law, a report of that corporation, for the fiscal year 1963 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

**SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF ALIENS—  
WITHDRAWAL OF NAME**

A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, withdrawing the name of David Yang from a report relating to aliens whose deportation has been suspended, transmitted to the Senate on July 1, 1964; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

**REPORTS OF COMMITTEES**

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. BAYH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment:

S. 1045. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Genevieve Olsen (Rept. No. 1332);

S. 2458. A bill for the relief of Lloyd K. Hirota (Rept. No. 1333);

S. 2750. A bill for the relief of Fred E. Starr (Rept. No. 1344);

H.R. 1451. An act for the relief of Frank Mramor (Rept. No. 1337); and

H.R. 6883. An act for the relief of the estate of Ellen G. Foster (Rept. No. 1338).

By Mr. BAYH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment:

S. 2133. A bill for the relief of Maj. Raymond G. Clark, Jr. (Rept. No. 1336); and

S. 2672. A bill for the relief of Robert L. Wolverton (Rept. No. 1335).

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment:

S. 2271. A bill for the relief of Shu Hsien Chang (Rept. No. 1341); and

S. 2790. A bill for the relief of Charles Chung Chi Lee and Julia Lee (Rept. No. 1342).

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment:

S. 2678. A bill for the relief of Dr. Victor M. Ubleta (Rept. No. 1343).

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with amendments:

S. 2759. A bill for the relief of Kim Sook Hee and Kim Lou (Rept. No. 1344).

By Mr. STENNIS, from the Committee on Appropriations, with amendments:

H.R. 11369. An act making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1339).

By Mr. BIBLE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

S. 2944. A bill for the relief of the Greater Southeast Community Hospital Foundation, Inc. (Rept. No. 1345);

H.R. 9975. An act to exempt from taxation certain property of the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States in the District of Columbia (Rept. No. 1346); and

H.R. 10215. An act relating to sick leave benefits for officers and members of the Metropolitan Police force of the District of Columbia, the United States Park Police force, and the White House Police force (Rept. No. 1347).

By Mr. MCINTYRE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

H.R. 6128. An act to amend section 15 of the Life Insurance Act to permit any stock life insurance company in the District of Columbia to maintain its record of stockholders at its principal place of business in the District of Columbia or at the office of its designated stock transfer agent in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1348).

**DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1965—REPORT OF  
A COMMITTEE (S. REPT. NO. 1331)**

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on Appropriations, I send forward a favorable report on H.R. 11202, which is the annual appropriation bill for the Department of Agriculture and related agencies. We recommend that the bill be passed with various amendments which we recommend.

Mr. President, I also send forward an extensive report for printing. May I say to the majority leader that the very voluminous report of hearings on the bill has been printed and is available. The Committee will be ready to take up the bill on the floor of the Senate at such time as the majority leader may indicate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SALINGER in the chair). The report will be received and the bill will be placed on the calendar.

**REPORT ENTITLED "INTERSTATE  
TRAFFIC IN MAIL-ORDER FIRE-  
ARMS"—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE—INDIVIDUAL VIEWS (S.  
REPT. NO. 1340)**

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, from the Committee on the Judiciary I submit a report entitled "Interstate Traffic in Mail Order Firearms" pursuant to Senate Resolution 274, 88th Congress, 2d session, together with the individual views of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART].

I ask unanimous consent that the report, together with the individual views, be printed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the report will be received and printed, as requested by the Senator from Connecticut.

**BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION  
INTRODUCED**

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. KEATING:

S. 3089. A bill for the relief of Dr. Haroutun M. Babigian; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KEATING (by request):

S. 3090. A bill for the relief of Dr. Orhan Kutlu; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KEATING:

S. 3091. A bill for the relief of Shabir Ahmad Kahn; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BAYH:

S. 3092. A bill to amend chapter 37 of title 38, United States Code, in order to make the widows of certain peacetime veterans eligible for loans under such chapter; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. LONG of Missouri (for himself and Mr. SALINGER):

S. 3093. A bill to provide for the erection of a monument on Alcatraz Island to commemorate the founding of the United

Nations in San Francisco, Calif., in 1945, and to serve as a symbol of peace; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

(See the remarks of Mr. LONG of Missouri when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. JACKSON:

S. 3094. A bill for the relief of Jen Cheng Shao; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey:

S. 3095. A bill for the relief of Stevan Akocs, his wife, Rozalija Akocs, and their children, Carlos Akocs and Jorge Akocs; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CHURCH:

S.J. Res. 190. Joint resolution providing for a study and report to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury concerning the silver policy of the United States; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

(See the remarks of Mr. CHURCH when he introduced the above joint resolution, which appear under a separate heading.)

**MONUMENT TO COMMEMORATE  
THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS ON ALCATRAZ ISLAND,  
CALIF.**

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, on Monday of this week I had the privilege and honor of filing with the Congress the final report of the Commission on the Disposition of Alcatraz Island. The Commission, established by Public Law 88-138 as amended by Public Law 88-226, made several recommendations in its report as to how best Alcatraz Island might be utilized.

Today, I have the privilege of introducing on behalf of myself and the Senator from California [Mr. SALINGER] legislation in this august body to implement the recommendations of the Commission. Representative JEFFREY COHELAN, of California, is introducing similar legislation in the House of Representatives today.

The primary purpose of this bill is to provide for the erection of a monument on Alcatraz Island to commemorate the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco, Calif., in 1945, and to serve as a symbol of peace.

To achieve this noble objective, this bill would establish a commission to be known as the United Nations Monument Commission. The Commission's function would be to develop and execute suitable plans for the erection of the monument. Moreover, the international architectural competition, designed to select the most suitable monument for erection on the island, will be under the general supervision of the Commission, as will be the demolition and removal of the present structures on the island and the building of the monument.

Although all costs incurred in the demolition and building aspects on the island are to be borne by the San Francisco Chapter of the American Association for the United Nations, rather than the Federal Government, the proposed legislation provides for the Commission, in consultation and cooperation with the Secretary of Interior, to oversee activities on Alcatraz. The National Park Service is charged with administering, protecting, and developing the monument after it is built.